Mozambique’s Elite – Finding its Way in a Globalized World and Returning to Old Development Models by Hanlon, Joseph & Mosse, Marcelo
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Mozambique’s Elite – Finding its Way in a Globalized
World and Returning to Old Development Models
Other
How to cite:
Hanlon, Joseph and Mosse, Marcelo (2010). Mozambique’s Elite – Finding its Way in a Globalized World and
Returning to Old Development Models. UNU-Wider.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2010 UNU-WIDER
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2010/en GB/wp2010-105/
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
 Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2010 
1 International Development Centre of the Open University, and London School of Economics. E-mail: 
j.hanlon@open.ac.uk. 2 Centre for Public Integrity, Mozambique. E-mail: marcelomosse@gmail.com 
 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on The Role of Elites in Economic 
Development, directed by Alice Amsden, James Robinson, and Alisa DiCaprio. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the 
governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 
Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom 
(Department for International Development—DFID). 
ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9230-342-6 
Working Paper No. 2010/105 
 
Mozambique’s Elite – Finding its 
Way in a Globalized World and 
Returning to Old Development 
Models 
 
Joseph Hanlon,1 and Marcelo Mosse2 
 
September 2010 
Abstract 
What makes elites developmental instead of predatory? We argue that Mozambique’s 
elite was developmental at independence 35 years ago. With pressure and 
encouragement from international forces, it became predatory. It has now partly 
returned to its developmental roots and is trying to use the state to promote the creation 
of business groups that could be large enough and dynamic enough to follow a 
development model with some similarities to the Asian Tigers, industrial development 
in Latin America, or Volkskapitalisme in apartheid South Africa. But Mozambique’s 
elite has also returned to two other traditions – that development is done by the elite and 
by foreigners. There is little support for development of local SMEs and agricultural 
development has been left to foreign-owned plantations. 
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1 Introduction 
A decade of ‘savage capitalism’ and corruption effectively culminated with the rush 
hour assassination in 2000 of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso and then the 
killing of the central bank’s head of banking supervision Antonio Macuacua (Siba-
Siba)a year later. The son of President Joaquim Chissano was charged with ordering the 
killing of Cardoso1 and linked by the media to the killing of Siba-Siba.2 Joaquim 
Chissano nearly lost the 1999 election3 and The Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (Frelimo) found that the vote against Chissano was largely due to 
complaints about corruption and what was seen by the voters as the lack of commitment 
to undertake anti-corruption measures. Under the constitution, Chissano could stand one 
more time for the presidency, but party members realized that his image was so 
tarnished that he would lose. So the party selected Armando Guebuza who went on to 
win the 2004 election with 64 per cent of the vote as its new leader. By the 1990s, 
Guebuza, a former Marxist political commissar of the army, had become one of 
Mozambique’s richest men. In this paper, we argue that Guebuza may be pursuing a 
new form of elite development capitalism – instead of using state rents purely for 
predation and consumption, some of these rents are now being directed to build a 
Mozambican industrial and commercial group. But we will argue also that this process 
is strongly shaped by Mozambique’s short history and by global pressures.  
 
This paper is presented in six sections. The first outlines recent Mozambican history. 
The second section discusses Mozambique’s shift to capitalism and corruption. Section 
three considers the changing shape of Mozambique’s elite capitalism in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. Section four goes on to discuss why this may be creating a 
base for a development model with some similarities to the Asian Tigers or 
Volkskapitalisme in apartheid South Africa. Fifth, we discuss governance and challenge 
donor thinking on patrimonialism and corruption. And finally, we raise a number of 
caveats and questions about whether the Frelimo elite is willing and able to follow the 
Asian model. 
2 History and factors which shaped it 
Every country has a specific history which shapes its development path. Three 
important factors have influenced Mozambique’s recent history: 
 
First, it is unusual in that the single liberation movement Frelimo has stayed united and 
is now the predominant political party, winning all multi-party elections. The party has 
never become personalized (as with Robert Mugabe in neighbouring Zimbabwe), and 
                                                 
1 Mozambique’s best investigative journalist, Carlos Cardoso, was assassinated in 2000. Nyimpine 
Chissano was charged with organizing the killing, but died on 11 November 2007, before the case 
came to trial.  
2  Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua, head of banking supervision at the Bank of Mozambique (central bank), 
was killed in 2001. The Nyimpine Chissano link is cited, for example, in Savana, Maputo, 7 
September 2006. 
3 Indeed, there is evidence that the results were manipulated in several provinces, leading to credible 
suggestions that Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama actually received more votes than Chissano. See 
Mozambique Political Process Bulletin (Maputo), various issues, notably 31: 29 December 2004. 
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there have been peaceful handovers of power. There are bitter personal and political 
conflicts within the party, but it has never split and there have been remarkably few 
defections or expulsions. A mark of Frelimo’s unity is that Chissano remained with the 
party and campaigned for Guebuza in 2004, despite having been rejected as leader. The 
present and most recent past presidents were liberation war leaders and now head 
important business groups. Thus the new elite of an independent Mozambique has its 
roots in the independence struggle, while its continuous control of the state has allowed 
the direction of state resources. Responding to five decades of rapid change and 
international pressure while maintaining unity and a nationalist development agenda has 
shaped the Mozambican elite and its development strategy.  
 
Second, Mozambique is a poor, small and peripheral state. Although it will be an 
important mineral-energy exporter, it lacks the oil wealth of Angola or Nigeria, which 
means it has not been hit by the ‘resource curse’ – there simply is not enough money for 
significant corruption.  
 
Third, Mozambique’s recent history has been shaped by international forces, including 
the cold war, the aid industry, and international development models ranging from state-
led modernization to neo-liberalism.  
 
Thus the leadership has had to juggle three often conflicting priorities: nationalism and 
development, class and self-interest, and overwhelming international pressure.  
 
Mozambique has gone through five distinct periods, each shaped by foreign intervention 
and by the attitudes of the elite (Hanlon 1991; Hanlon 1996; Hanlon and Smart 2008): 
 
Liberation war (1965-74): Portugal refused to follow the British or French models of 
decolonization, and NATO backed Portugal’s attempt to retain its colonies. Frelimo was 
Mozambique’s liberation movement, and it gained support from both China and the 
Soviet Union, as well as left parties in Europe. Internal divisions led to several killings, 
including the assassination of the first president, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969. The 
movement then learned to hang together and has maintained a remarkable unity since. 
Samora Machel was elected president in 1970 and Frelimo began to make gains against 
the Portuguese colonists. A coup in Portugal in 1974 led by a military tired of fighting 
colonial wars opened the way to independence the next year. 
 
Socialism (1975-81): With the coup, Portugal stopped the war and Frelimo, as the only 
liberation movement, took power. This was the era of the one-party developmental state 
in Africa, so there was no challenge to Frelimo merging party and state. Under 
Portuguese colonialism, government and the economy were dominated by Portuguese 
settlers, and the regime had been quite brutal, so the majority of fearful settlers fled 
back to Portugal. Social services (health, education, law, funerals) were nationalized but 
industry was largely left alone. However many businesses were abandoned, so the state, 
by default, ended up with a key and unexpected role in a mixed economy. Inexperienced 
and often poorly educated Mozambicans filled the gaps, but within two years managed 
to turn around administrative and economic collapse: the economy was growing and 
there was a rapid expansion of health and education. Five years after independence, 
Frelimo remained immensely popular, both for ending colonial oppression and for the 
expansion of health and education. 
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Frelimo was a party of modernization, both socially with a promotion of women’s rights 
and an attempt to end ‘traditional’ authority, and economically, President Machel 
claimed that Mozambique could win ‘victory over underdevelopment’ in just a decade, 
the 1980s. Increasingly influenced, and supported by, the Socialist East bloc, Frelimo 
adopted a socialist policy, with the state playing the leading role in a still mixed 
economy. Communal villages would modernize the countryside, giant industries and 
state farms would transform the economy. For this paper, attitude of that era becomes 
significant – the belief that a well intentioned and genuinely honest and hard-working 
elite could transfer Mozambique. Policy was top down, and there was little space for 
initiatives from below. 
 
War (1982-92): Ronald Reagan took office as President of the United States in 1981 
and immediately intensified the cold war. Proxy wars between East and West took place 
in Angola, Mozambique and Nicaragua, and the US backed white minority rule 
(apartheid) in South Africa as a bastion against neighbouring ‘communist’ states. In 
Mozambique an opposition guerrilla movement, Renamo,4 was formed. In an initially 
unsuccessful attempt to pacify the United States, Mozambique joined the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund in 1984. The war escalated in 1986, with the killing of 
President Samora Machel5 and invasions of two northern provinces. As the war raged, 
Mozambique introduced a World Bank structural adjustment programme, which 
included a large privatization programme. Peace was only possible with the end of the 
cold war, which brought the end of apartheid in South Africa. A peace accord was 
signed in 1992 which recognized the legitimacy of the government and the existing 
constitution, but ensured multi-party elections and made Renamo the only serious 
opposition party. 
 
The war, with its breakdown of commerce and dependence on government for food and 
services encouraged the maintenance of the centralized control by Frelimo. Indeed, it 
can be argued that by the time the 10-year plan had been agreed in 1979, the party was 
already moving away from a totally centralized model, and that the war effectively 
prevented economic decentralization. 
 
Capitalism and the Washington Consensus (1993-2001): The opposition movement 
Renamo, failed to displace Frelimo as the natural party of government. Joaquim 
Chissano, who had replaced Samora Machel, was elected president in multi-party 
elections in 1994 and 1999. In the 1990s, the IMF eclipsed the World Bank in 
Mozambique as the major influence on economic policy. It imposed a harsh structural 
adjustment programme which included a limit on post-war reconstruction and limits on 
health and education spending. The economy had grown under the first adjustment 
programme, during the war, but declined in the post war period and there was no peace 
dividend. The IMF also capped the amount of aid Mozambique could receive. But with 
its turn to the West and capitalism, Mozambique had become a donor darling. In 1995, 
                                                 
4 UN figures show that at the end of the war in 1992, Renamo occupied 25 per cent of the land but 
controlled only 6 per cent of the population. Renamo became the official opposition party. More than 
1 million people (7 per cent of the population) had died; the economy was devastated and damage 
exceeded US$20 billion. 
5 Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash which was never formally explained but is generally 
attributed to a false navigation beacon set up by the South Africans. 
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donors protested the aid cap and not only was the IMF was forced to lift it, but the 
World Bank again regained dominance over economic policy in Mozambique. 
 
This was the era of ‘savage capitalism’ with the state forced to withdraw from the 
economy. There was widespread privatization – small firms went to members of the 
Frelimo elite and larger firms went to foreign companies – and rapidly growing 
corruption. Meanwhile, although loosening the IMF cap led to economic growth in 
1996-8, the economy declined again in 1999-2001 and poverty increased, raising 
questions about Washington Consensus economic policies. Taken together, these 
brought the era of donor-promoted capitalism to an end. 
 
History will perhaps see the 1990s as an era of a particularly bizarre cult of capitalism. 
Both the international community and Frelimo professed a belief that entrepreneurs 
would sprout up like weeds, fully formed and trained and ready to compete. Privatized 
businesses were handed to military and political leaders who assumed that their 
leadership experience would equip them to run businesses, with no training and no 
experience of competition and having to make a profit and repay loans. Indeed, many 
enthusiastically accepted the old cartoon image of capitalists having big cars and 
offices, doing no work, and living off the workers. Some domestic businesses 
succeeded, but there as a strong shift to foreign ownership and dominance of the 
economy. 
 
Productive elite capitalism (2002- ): Even as it fell out of fashion elsewhere, donors in 
Mozambique retained their commitment to the neo-liberal economic policies. As 
recently as 2006, the IMF used the phase ‘trickle down’ in a Mozambique document 
(IMF 2006).6 Poverty reduction was largely left to the international community. Big 
foreign owned plantations dominated agricultural development. But quietly the 
Mozambican elite began to direct state resources into productive investment. Guebuza 
strengthened, broadened and decentralized the party, while retaining quite tight central 
control. A serious crackdown on some corruption began.  
 
The implications of this current period are the subject of the rest of this paper. 
3 Capitalism and corruption 
The late 1970s had been an era of exceptional integrity,7 the leadership under Samora 
Machel was puritanical and corruption was harshly punished, while the enthusiasm for 
independence and building a new country created a collaborative spirit that militated 
against private enrichment (Lopes 2002).8 
 
                                                 
6 In 1992 John Kenneth Galbraith described trickle-down theory as ‘the less than elegant metaphor that 
if one feeds the horse enough oats, some will pass through to the road for the sparrows’. 
7 In 1980 Franciso Langa, a revolutionary war leader and central committee member, was caught 
stealing money meant for Zimbabwe refugees. He committed suicide from shame, and an 
unprecedented central committee statement publicized the embezzlement and suicide. 
8 During the Samora Machel era people who were seen as corrupt or dissolute were publicly labelled as 
‘xiconhacas’, a compound word from the nickname Xico which referred to the old Portuguese secret 
police PIDE and nhoca, which means snake.  
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Michel Moran (2000) argues that authoritarian states tend to limit criminal activity 
through excessive regulation which limits the opportunities for corruption. Corruption, 
misuse of state property, and commerce outside the tight state regulations were treated 
politically, as actions against the state. As the war intensified, Frelimo tied to curb 
unregulated trading through increasingly authoritarian methods, culminating in the 
execution of trader Gulami Nabi on 9 April 1983 for running a prawn smuggling 
network. 
 
But the worsening war made control impossible. Attempts to maintain fixed prices 
failed and there was increased illegal trading in rural areas. Even State farms bought 
food on the parallel market to feed their workers. And the war inevitably created 
corruption among senior military figures. 
 
The harsh IMF adjustment programme of 1991 reduced civil service wages and by 1993 
even nurses and teachers had fallen below the poverty line. Everyone needed extra 
money, so civil servants stole time (to tend gardens or do second jobs) or resources 
(using state cars as taxis). Teachers, nurses and others in contact with the public 
expected informal fees. Within just a few years, petty corruption became 
institutionalized. People remembered the late 1970s, when no one asked for a bribe, and 
were angry, but understanding – they did not approve but realized that the nurse had to 
feed her family. 
 
With war, corruption increased and a new form of capitalism arose. Although 
Mozambique was closely aligned with the socialist bloc and Frelimo professed to be a 
socialist party, its image of socialism was closer to a Nordic social democracy. The state 
played a leading role in the economy and in development, and trade was regulated, but 
there was to be a large private sector and foreign investment. Indeed, in 1979 Frelimo 
began a programme of re-privatization of small and medium sized businesses that had 
been abandoned by the Portuguese and were being run by the state. The war stopped 
this process, as the opposition movement, Renamo attacked small businesses in rural 
areas and towns. 
 
Privatization resumed in the late 1980s and backed by the donors and World Bank and 
IMF, who were soon hailing the privatization of more than 1,000 businesses as a great 
success. In order to promote this success, donors colluded in a highly non-transparent 
privatization process. Indeed, the World Bank admitted that it pressed local banks to 
lend World Bank funds to members of the elite with newly privatized businesses, 
knowing the loans would not be repaid. Some donors also allowed the aid money to be 
given to these newly privatized businesses, with no expectation of repayment (Hanlon 
2004). For the former ‘socialist’ Frelimo elite it was a strange lesson in capitalism – 
people were given businesses and then given loans they did not need to repay. 
Inevitably, many of these businesses collapsed. 
 
Finally, the formal transition to multi-party democracy in 1994 was not accompanied by 
conflict of interest regulations or asset reporting and other transparency requirements. 
Thus the elite came to understand that ‘democracy’ and ‘capitalism’ meant that they 
were allowed to use their privileged positions to accumulate wealth unobserved. 
 
In an earlier article (Hanlon 2004), we argued that donors promoted corruption in 
Mozambique. In their rush to promote Mozambique as a free-market aid success, they 
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entered into a tacit agreement with the elite that corruption would be permitted so long 
as ‘market-friendly’ policies and all other donor demands were accepted and publicly 
praised. The crunch came when the IMF and World Bank forced9 (Hanlon 2002) the 
privatization of two state banks in 1995 and 1996. In both cases honest central bank 
officials warned the Bretton Woods institutions that the only potential buyers were 
corrupt, but the reply was that even a corrupt privatization was better than state 
ownership.10 
 
This was an era of what was known as ‘goatism’ (cabritismo), from the saying ‘a goat 
eats where it is tied’. In other words, people wanted a share of whatever passed within 
their reach. No project could go ahead without local and national party officials 
extracting a share. The situation deteriorated so much that many projects could not go 
ahead because the share for the goats made them unprofitable. David Stasavage (1999) 
notes that this was encouraged by a civil service organization in which bureaucrats 
maintained extensive power and discretion over economic processes. Increasingly in the 
smaller neo-liberal state, bureaucrats only had power to block economic development 
and had few resources to assist, so they became increasingly rent seeking. Many of the 
corrupt Frelimo elite were supported by donors and the international financial 
institutions, who assured them that by becoming personally rich, they would actually 
promote development.  
 
This picture of ‘goatism’ and rapacious capitalism is not the only one, and Frelimo was 
always divided. An earlier paper (Hanlon 2002) argues that the Frelimo elite was 
divided into ‘predatory’ and ‘developmental’ groups. The former looked to personal 
gain, assumed everything including the legal system was for sale, and expected the 
party to protect them; development was to be left to the donors and foreign investors. 
The latter group, while still accepting capitalism and wanting to live well, also looked to 
entrepreneurial activities that would promote Mozambican development, and continued 
with a traditional Frelimo ideology of wanting to ‘develop’ Mozambique. 
 
But the divisions within the party widened. Armando Guebuza was backed by the 
developmental and traditional wings of the party in opposition to Chissano. A former 
interior and transport minister and political commissar of the army, he was one of the 
Frelimo leaders who actually understood Marxism, and thus also understood the 
significance of the shift to modern capitalism. He began to use his links in transport and 
government to become involved in real businesses, including fishing (which requires 
government licences) and port management. By the time of his selection as head of the 
party and presidential candidate, he was believed to be one of the richest people in 
Mozambique. 
 
Anthropologist Jason Sumich links the Frelimo ideology to a narrative of modernization 
(Sumich 2008a, b). Portuguese fascism intentionally kept Mozambican and Portuguese 
peasants illiterate and poor; the revolutionaries came from a tiny elite who had been 
                                                 
9 Privatization was a ‘necessary condition’ of a World Bank agreement. If the condition was not met, 
the agreement would be automatically cancelled. Since all aid was conditional on having a World 
Bank agreement, that would have ended all aid to Mozambique, and people would have starved. 
10 Both banks were privatized to consortia containing members of the Frelimo elite, and the two banks 
failed after being looted of more than US$400 million (often in the form of loans which were not 
repaid).  
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able to obtain at least a minimal education, and they saw one role of the revolution as 
modernizing Mozambique and pulling it into the twentieth century. In 1979 President 
Samora Machel launched a plan to ‘overcome underdevelopment’ in a decade. Thirty 
years later, President Armando Guebuza is calling for ‘victory over absolute poverty’. 
Machel’s model involved rapid industrialization, including a textile factory in each of 
the 10 provinces. Today there is more stress on electrification, computers and mobile 
telephones. Sumich points to the way the elite sees itself with a mission to modernize 
the poor. But that is a double edged sword. On one side, it is paternalistic and treats 
peasants as backward, which justifies the position of the elite (and its children) as 
leaders. The modernization narrative means that the elite and their children often have 
more links with the modern western world, through television, internet and travel, than 
they do with Mozambique’s rural areas. On the other side, it has led to a huge expansion 
of education and ensured that development is more than an electoral slogan.  
 
A final comment is necessary on the way that the elite links to Africa and Mozambique. 
Mozambique’s elite remains highly nationalist. There is little evidence of large foreign 
bank accounts, palaces abroad, or hiring airplanes for foreign shopping trips. To be sure, 
there are modest flats in South Africa or Portugal. But the new rich tend to invest in 
Mozambique – million dollar houses in the capital Maputo, beach-front weekend 
properties and expensive cars. And, perhaps most important, they invest in their 
children, sending them to the best private schools in Maputo and then to universities 
abroad. And the young tend to return to take up jobs in non-government organizations, 
government, or business – which also has the effect of perpetuating the elite dominance. 
However, the elite is not closed to newcomers. The post-independence expansion of 
health and education created a new middle class of teachers and nurses who, 
themselves, had not been to university but were able to send their children to 
Mozambican universities. And talented and educated young people from middle class 
families can rise in the party, state, NGOs and business and some are absorbed into 
what is still an expanding elite. This does, however, create a potential political issue 
within the Frelimo party. Chissano and Guebuza were born in 1939 and 1943 
respectively and were leaders in the liberation war; the next group is the children of 
those liberation leaders or those who were in secondary school at independence. 
Younger people increasingly feel they are better educated and more capable than their 
elders (reflecting the modernization narrative) but have no voice. 
4 Elite capital in the twenty first century 
The election of Armando Guebuza as head of Frelimo in June 2002, showed that the 
excesses of the 1990s were no longer acceptable. It also marked an important change of 
attitude and approach to the party, government, and especially to development strategy. 
 
Guebuza spent substantial time rebuilding the Frelimo party at provincial and local level 
and later decentralizing government administration; party and state were brought closer 
together and there was increasing pressure for state functionaries to join the party. Local 
development committees and local officials for the first time had real power over 
spending local budgets, while at the same time Guebuza and Frelimo centralized control 
over major decisions. The revitalized party became an important channel of two way 
communication, information passing up from the bottom made Frelimo much more 
responsive to grass roots concerns, but instructions passing from top to bottom 
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increased central control. Although personal patronage was still dispensed by the old 
guard, it was increasingly the party rather than individuals who controlled patronage.  
 
In the 1990s, the nomenklatura used their state links for acquiring land and explicit rent-
seeking through loans which were not repaid, commissions, and interests in foreign 
investments designed purely to receive a share of profits. We argue here that there may 
be a shift to creating what appear to be well run businesses, using state access to gain 
contracts and licences, but increasingly carrying out the work and doing it well.  
 
There have also been two interesting experiments to support non-elite capitalism, which 
perhaps show a different mood. First, from the base, the message to Guebuza and 
Frelimo was about the lack of jobs and money. Meanwhile the manifest failure of the 
Washington Consensus development model still being promoted led some officials to, 
for the first time, ignore donors. In an unprecedented move, without consulting the 
donors, the new Guebuza government inserted a budget line to give US$250,000 a year 
to each of 128 districts for local development and job creation, with decisions at district 
level. This reflected the old model that capitalists grow like weeds and do not need 
training. Many Mozambicans believe that they can be as good business people as more 
experienced South Africans or domestic Asian-origin traders, and all they need is 
money. This programme explicitly backs that belief. These are supposed to be loans, but 
very few are being repaid because inexperience means ideas cannot be turned into 
profitable businesses. 
 
The second, much more successful, experiment was the transformation of the cashew 
industry. In 1995 at the height of the neo-liberal mania World Bank conditionally 
contributed to the destruction of the local cashew industry by enforcing free export of 
unprocessed nuts (Hanlon 2000). From 2001 a government agency for cashew worked 
with local institutions to reverse the World Bank imposed policy and support the entire 
value chain, with support for new processing factories and restrictions on exporting 
unprocessed nuts. Unlike the district local development grants, cashew development has 
been backed by substantial technical and business support. By 2006, 6,000 factory jobs 
had been created. But the whole process was done quietly, with little publicity, so as to 
avoid a negative response from the World Bank and donors.  
 
Meanwhile, there is a transition to a new style of elite capitalism, although this has been 
neither smooth nor even. Guebuza is aggressively expanding businesses in which he has 
personal interest. But he is also attracting the brightest of the foreign trained young 
generation who work hard and want to move quickly, while marginalizing the old 
comrades who are only trying to get rich through ‘goatism’ and influence, using their 
family and party links. But gangster capitalism, ‘goatism’ and petty corruption did not 
end suddenly or completely, and linger on. Key members of the elite have built on bases 
created in the 1990s and expanded their interests under the party and state umbrella:11 
 
The Guebuza family, for example, owns many Mozambican companies. The main 
company partly owned by the President is Intelec, which is involved in electricity 
transmission and equipment, telecommunications, gas, consulting, cement, tourism, 
construction, Tata vehicles, and fishing. The company is headed by Salimo Amad 
                                                 
11 Ownership data is published in Boletim da Republica. See also Mosse (2005). 
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Abdula, who is also head of the Mozambican business association,12 which gives 
President Guebuza a direct role in all Mozambican business. Intelec also holds 5 per 
cent of Vodacom Moçambique, the private mobile telephone company which competes 
with the state operator and Abdula recently became chair of the board of Vodacom 
Moçambique.13 Cornelder de Mocambique which has the port management contracts 
for Beira and Quelimane is partly owned Guebuza (the majority is owned by Cornelder 
in the Netherlands and CFM, the state railway company). 
 
Guebuza children and relatives have interests in various companies, often in 
participation with other children of the elite, and are involved in telecommunications, 
mining, construction, tourism, environmental issues, petrol stations, and a new grain 
terminal; several consultancy companies have also been established. Armando Guebuza 
is also a shareholder in some of them, particularly through the family company Focus 
21. 
 
Guebuza family companies have a number of projects around natural gas from a large 
field on the coast at Inhambane. Intelec had a gas fired power station supplying 
electricity to Vilankulo, the nearest city to the gas field. It is part of a group (linked to 
the French company Suez) building a second power station along the existing pipeline 
in Moamba, in part to sell electricity to South Africa. A company owned by another 
member of the family has the contract to convert and sell natural gas as motor fuel. 
 
Two other traditional Frelimo leaders have important business interests. Graça Machel, 
former education minister, widow of Samora Machel and wife of Nelson Mandela, 
remains a key figure in the developmental wing of the party. Her Community 
Development Foundation14 and group Whatana have made a range of development-
linked investments, and have links with Petromoc, the state petroleum company. 
Whatana also holds 5 per cent of Vodacom Moçambique and is proposing to purchase 
an interest in a large Mozambican bank. 
 
And former president Joaquim Chissano is building his business interests through the 
Fundação Joaquim Chissano and TIKO Investimentos, partly with the US$5 million Mo 
Ibrahim Prize for African Leadership which he won in 2007. In contrast to Guebuza and 
Machel, Chissano is involved in grander projects which rely much more on external 
money and expertise. TIKO in late 2008 bought a small troubled airline, Transairways. 
And the foundation is involved in an US$8 billion oil refinery in Maputo, jointly with 
Petromoc. However, in early 2009 it became clear that money could not be found for 
the project.15 Chissano has also failed to attract the younger and more competent 
generation to his businesses, which are increasingly accused of being poorly run.16 The 
                                                 
12 CTA, Confereração das Associações Económicas. 
13 Presidente do Conselho de Administração da Vodacom Moçambique. 
14 Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade 
15 Indian Ocean Newsletter, 25 February 2009. 
16 Savana, Maputo, 8 May 2009, comments: ‘os círculos próximos do ex argumentam que o homem e os 
seus próximos ainda não estão muito familiarizados na área do ‘business’ e esqueceram-se de fazer as 
‘due diligence’ à empresa dos pequenos aviões que compraram’. (Circles close to the ex [president] 
argue that the man and those close to him are not very familiar with the area of business, and forgot to 
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most visible face of his enterprises is former foreign minister Leonardo Simão, who is 
head of the foundation, but whose own company, Golden Rose Fields, was temporarily 
closed down in 2007 by government inspectors because of very poor conditions for its 
workers.17 
 
The Brazilian Companhia Vale do Rio Doce was awarded a mining licence for one of 
the largest untapped coking coal reserves in the world, in Tete province in December 
2004, just before Chissano left office; Chissano in 2005 became a non-executive 
director of African Rainbow Minerals, a South African black empowerment company 
owned by millionaire Patrice Motsepe, which subsequently signed a joint venture with 
Vale. Chissano was then guest of honour at the official opening of the project on 28 
March 2009.18 
 
Finally, playing a less active role are a number of state and party companies. SPI is the 
investment company of the Frelimo party, while SPF serves as an investment company 
for veterans of the liberation war. SPI seems caught in the old rent-seeking days, 
illustrated in 2006 when a company part-owned by SPI was given the contract to install 
a non-invasive scanner in the port of Maputo; all containers going through the port had 
to pass through the scanner, and pay a fee of US$20 to US$100 per container (Hanlon 
and Smart 2008: 116). 
5 Returning to an old development model? 
The leader of a different development model is not a hang-over from the 1990s, but a 
new group of companies, Insitec, created by Guebuza protégé Celso Correia. He is a 
prime example of the way dynamism and elite links have mixed. At independence, the 
Cahora Bassa dam, one of the largest in Africa, remained in Portuguese ownership.19 
Thirty years after independence, Guebuza wanted to take the dam into national 
ownership, while Portugal wanted to sell because it urgently needed money to reduce its 
budget deficit to meet European Union rules, but the IMF would not allow Mozambique 
to take on additional debt. Correia was a good friend of the son-in-law of a good friend 
of Guebuza, and Correia used his links to arrange a meeting with Guebuza. He then did 
the financial engineering that allowed the debt to rest with banks and the dam company 
itself. His success in organizing the take-over of Cahora Bassa has propelled him into 
the centre of the network of companies around Guebuza. 
 
In 2007, as part of the Cahora Bassa deal, Insitec was allowed to take over the 18 per 
cent local share of the second-largest bank, BCI-Fomento, and Correia became 
president of the bank; the rest is owned by Portuguese banks Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
                                                                                                                                               
do a ‘due diligence’ [audit] on the small airplanes business they bought’.) See also, O Pais, Maputo, 
17 April 2009 on poor management of Transairways. 
17 ‘Até à criação de melhores condições de trabalho: Suspenso funcionamento da ‘Golden Roses 
Fields’,’ Notícias, Maputo, 3 November 2007. 
18 ‘Show Chissano’, Savana, 3 April 2009. 
19 The dam was built by Portugal to supply electricity to apartheid South Africa, which was charged a 
very low price in exchange for support in the colonial war. At independence, Frelimo refused to take 
responsibility for the ‘great white elephant’ because income would never cover the payments on bonds 
taken out to pay for construction. 
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(51 per cent) and BPI (30 per cent).20 Correia has quickly moved BCI into actively 
carrying out the government’s development strategy. A repeated and bitter complaint is 
that the privatized banking system is concentrated in the big cities and has closed branch 
banks in market towns and refused to reopen them despite political pressure. Under 
Correia, BCI has expanded to 50 branches and has won high praise from the governor of 
the Bank of Mozambique, Ernesto Gove. Similarly, when a US company abandoned its 
interest in managing the northern railways in 2008, it was Insitec and BCI that took over 
the shares. 
 
There are four companies in the group, Intéllica and I-Tec which specialize in 
computers and information technology, Insitec-Constroi in construction, and Energia 
Capital dealing with the energy sector and bio-fuels.  
 
Insitec is young. Correia is 31 years old, and the average age of his partners is 30; he 
argues that young people are more dynamic and entrepreneurial.21 Correia said that an 
Insitec policy is to form links with bigger foreign companies in order to raise Insitec’s 
performance. In 2006 Insitec took over the consulting arm of Ernst & Young in 
Mozambique. Insitec-Constroi has linked up with foreign construction companies to 
improve quality and speed; it successfully built a new building for the National 
Communications Institute (INCM) in partnership with Segecoa Moç, a Chinese 
construction company based in Mozambique. 
 
Energia Capital is partly owned by two parastatal companies with important party links: 
GPZ, the Zambezi river valley development office, and SOGIR, an investment company 
itself owned by GPZ and various other state companies in telecommunication, 
electricity and insurance. Energia Capital and a Brazilian company Camargo Corrêa 
have been given the right to build the US$3.2 bn Mphanda Nkuwa dam on the Zambezi 
river and a 1400 km power line to link it to Maputo; a project now delayed by the global 
depression. 
 
Insitec gives its vision as: ‘To achieve an international presence and recognition as a 
company which is fundamental for the development of southern Africa’.22 Insitec 
already works in Angola, DRC and South Africa. In December 2008 BCI said it wanted 
to become a regional bank, and is negotiating to take over part of a South African bank. 
 
Another new and important player is Moçambique Capitais, set up by former Bank of 
Mozambique governor Prakash Ratilal. It has more than 220 individual Mozambican 
shareholders and a requirement that no one person can hold more than 10 per cent of 
shares. In a recent interview, Ratilal stressed that the company was still open to new 
investors ‘but not to any rascal’ (‘malandro’). Investments will not be accepted from 
money laundering or other illicit activities, he said (Carmona 2010). Ratilal has gone 
into partnership with the billionaire Stanley Ho, who made his fortune in Macau 
gambling, to create Moza Banco and Moza Capital (51 per cent Moçambique Capitais, 
                                                 
20 CGD lent Insitec most of the money needed to buy the Mozambican share of the bank, according to 
Correia. Savana, 15 June 2007. 
21 Savana, 15 June 2007. 
22 Conseguir reconhecimento e presença internacional como empresa fundamental para o 
desenvolvimento da região da África Austral. Insitec (http://www.itec.co.mz/). 
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49 per cent Ho’s Geocapital), which are prioritizing investment in agriculture, 
particularly bio-fuels, and trade with China; Moza Banco prides itself on having 100 per 
cent Mozambican staff. 
 
Ratilal has been a long term proponent of the view that Mozambique needs a 
development bank, but he stresses that Moza Banco and Moza Capital are investment 
banks which must make a profit, and not development banks which should be providing 
both subsidized credit and a range of technical support to new small and medium 
businesses. State support for the private sector will be ‘decisive’, he argues, and the 
state must promote new businesses; ‘the boom in Brazil did not just come from the 
private sector’ but from promotion and support by government, the Brazilian 
development bank, and universities (Carmona 2010). 
 
Finally, Ratilal declares: ‘I believe that this region [southern Africa] is in a situation 
very similar to that which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in the Far East, with the 
huge growth of Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Indonesia’ (Carmona 2010). And 
the shift from unproductive to productive rent-seeking begins to look more like an 
attempt to emulate the path they followed as they promoted industrialization (Wade 
1990), typically through a combination of subsidy and protection which allowed 
privileged local private firms and groups to grow to a size at which they could be 
competitive. In East Asia, private companies were selected as ‘national champions’ and 
supported and built up by government (Kaplinsky 2008). This was combined with 
policies which forced local firms to become more efficient, innovative and competitive, 
and penalized those which were lazy or ineffective and simply survived on the 
protection.  
 
A similar model was followed in Latin America, notably in Brazil and Mexico in the 
1940s–60s. Mexico is an important example for Mozambique, because Mexico was a 
predominant party state in which the party maintained support by promoting 
development using agricultural23 and mineral revenues, as Frelimo hopes to do in 
Mozambique (Hanlon and Smart 2008: ch. 9), and because of its revolutionary history 
Mexico had the same family links between the private sector and state (Camp 1989). In 
both Brazil and Mexico key elements were: (1) cheap, directed finance from the 
development bank – Nafinsa in Mexico and BNDE in Brazil; (2) state companies and 
state investment in private companies; (3) subsidized services and inputs; (4) protection 
of production for domestic markets; (5) preference in state contracts; and (6) export 
incentives of up to 20 per cent. Although the programmes were successful, Richard 
Auty argues that for two reasons policies were less successful than in Korea. First, 
Korea moved steadily though labour-intensive to capital-intensive manufacturing, while 
Brazil and Mexico tried to leap over the labour-intensive stage, which depressed the rate 
of employment creation. Second, Mexico protected a rent-seeking elite (amiguismo – 
‘friendism’ – was the Mexican equivalent to cabritismo – ‘goatism’) and failed to push 
firms to be competitive and innovative (Auty 1994). 
 
                                                 
23 An important aspect of Mexican policy which could provide a useful lesson for Mozambique was that 
from 1945 through 1955, there was ‘vast state investment in irrigation (and related infrastructure)’ 
which caused agricultural output to grow at 9 per cent per year, which in turn helped to fund state 
investment in manufacturing (Cypher 1990). 
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Closer to home, in South Africa in the 1940s, Afrikaner industrialization was built on 
state and public support for a small group of financial institutions, led by Sanlam, which 
in turn financed the development of manufacturing (O’Meara 1983). The core argument 
behind the policies in all of these countries is that, in contrast to the neo-liberal view, 
state intervention is essential because transnational capital is predatory and will try to 
block local development, because domestic entrepreneurs are weak and lack the 
necessary capital (as well as being risk averse), and because it can take a decade to gain 
profitability which is too long for companies acting on their own. 
 
Indeed, as an alternative to the World Bank-IMF Washington Consensus, Keun Lee, 
John Mathews, and Robert Wade propose the BeST (Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo) Consensus 
(Lee et al. 2007). They write that ‘the BeST Consensus starts with the proposition that 
palliative policies, focused on poverty reduction (as in the Millennium Development 
Goals), must not be confused with development policies. Development policies take as 
their touchstone building capacities of (local or joint venture) firms’. The BeST 
Consensus combines assistance to exporters with temporary assistance to selected 
import-substituting production. They continue: ‘When state intervention weakens 
market incentives the state has to supplement market discipline with alternative 
disciplining mechanisms, such as sunset clauses on industry assistance. The East Asian 
economies provide abundant evidence on how to do what mainstream economists say is 
impossible – promote exports and import-substitution at the same time’. To encourage 
local or joint venture firms to grow and reinvest, they are given preferential access to 
certain sectors and learning opportunities. ‘The choice of which sectors to target is made 
easier in late-developers as compared to already developed countries, because they are 
much further back from the world frontier’. 
 
Is this what is happening now in Mozambique? President Armando Guebuza appears to 
be building up a group of companies around information technology and including 
bright, young, well-educated, and, most importantly, competent, Mozambicans. 
6 Patrimonialism and corruption 
Mobutu Sese Seko is often held up to exemplify the evil of corruption and 
patrimonialism. Kept in power by the West during the Cold War, he is estimated to have 
stolen US$5 billion, decimated his country, and created the conditions for the ongoing 
wars in the now Democratic Republic of Congo. With the end of the Cold War, the 
West imposed the free market as the alternative to Mobutu. But it is dangerous to use a 
particular ogre as a basis of development theory.  
 
Economist Ha-Joon Chang points out that Suharto in Indonesia, another corrupt 
Western-backed dictator, stole an amount equivalent to Mobuto – about five times the 
country’s GDP when he took power (Chang 2007). ‘Yet where Zaire’s living standards 
fell by three times during Mobutu’s rule, Indonesia’s rose by more than three times 
during Suharto’s rule’. In his book Bad Samaritans, his label for the rich countries and 
the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization, he argues that they are 
‘increasingly using corruption as an “explanation” for the failures of the neo-liberal 
policies that they have promoted over the past two and a half decades’. To be sure, Zaire 
under Mobutu was ruined by rampant corruption. But, he notes, when the United States, 
Britain and France developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they were 
‘spectacularly corrupt’. In the twentieth century Italy, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China 
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developed rapidly economically in parallel with ‘widespread and often massive’ 
corruption. Bribes are simply transfers of money, and the question is whether that 
money is then used productively. The difference between Zaire and Indonesia, Chang 
argues, is that money from Zaire was deposited in Swiss banks, while ‘in Indonesia, the 
money from corruption mostly stayed inside the country, creating jobs and incomes’. In 
Mozambique, as in Indonesia, the money largely stays within the country.  
 
The broadening definition of ‘corruption’ is also an issue. At least four senses seem 
relevant here. One is blatant graft, theft, or cabritismo, when money is simply taken by 
bureaucrats and politicians; the near destruction of the banking system in the Chissano 
era shows the danger of this. Perhaps most commonly, ‘corruption’ is taken to mean 
bribery in which a decision is taken or contract awarded in exchange for an illegal fee; 
Nathaniel Leff argues that this is not always bad and can actually increase economic 
efficiency (Leff 2002). Heidenheimer and Johnston in their massive tome Political 
Corruption point to the issue of corrupt party funding in nearly all democracies 
(Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002), and in Mozambique at least part of the money from 
high level theft and bribes goes to the Frelimo party. A fourth and newer sense of 
corruption might be called ‘allocational’. In Mozambique in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, with the support and encouragement of the international community, privatized 
companies were allocated to preferred individuals and groups. Now, contracts are 
allocated preferentially to domestic companies even if this violates rules, or to 
companies linked to Frelimo or to local elites, and we argue this can be positive and 
may be essential for development. Indeed, Chang argues that the ‘Bad Samaritans’ have 
totally distorted the meaning of the word ‘corruption’, turning it to mean actions which 
go against their policies.  
 
Raphie Kaplinsky and Ha-Joon Chang (Chang 2002) both point to the problem of global 
political pressures against industrial policies designed to promote state-assisted 
development. Governments are no longer permitted to provide the range of subsidies 
and other forms of support which facilitated industrial growth in previous eras. In 
particular, then, the kinds of policies which promoted industrialization in other 
developing countries – preferential access to government tenders, subsidies, and direct 
interaction with government policy makers – are now seen as improper and corrupt.  
 
That brings us to two opposing descriptions of the Mozambican firms and groups 
developing around the present and past presidents. The most common picture, painted 
by the donors and the international financial agencies, is of a corrupt elite using its 
access to state resources for personal gain, blocking access to more efficient foreign 
firms and extracting rents from the higher prices that can be charged for goods and 
services. 
 
But we can paint another picture. Given Mozambique’s history and social context, it is 
logical that enterprises which can be ‘national champions’ will develop around powerful 
people, such as the present and past presidents. Changing international rules and 
attitudes, which are now biased toward transnational corporations and against local 
capital, mean that the methods used to support ‘national champions’ in Asia, Latin 
America and South Africa are no longer acceptable. But what is now being treated as 
corrupt and as poor governance is, in fact, a sensible latecomer development strategy, 
and is merely doing what other developing countries showed was necessary to build a 
few regionally and globally competitive companies.  
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Insitec has clearly benefitted from some less than transparent decisions by the 
government, for example over the Mpanda Nkuwa dam and power line. Similarly, 
without tender, Insitec was given three key sites in central Maputo, including a Ministry 
of Labour car park, for buildings it plans to construct.24 The independent weekly 
Savana25 reported that Correia and Insitec had come under pressure to give some 
Frelimo ‘goats’ an interest in the company; Correia replied that he did not need that 
kind of ‘political muscle’. But he added that ‘big business is normally aligned with the 
grand national political strategies of the country.’ This happened in the past in the now 
developed countries and must happen in Mozambique, where the private sector is very 
young, he said. 
 
Mobutu became infamous not only for his kleptocracy, but also because he was seen to 
epitomize African ‘patrimonial’ rule. ‘Patrimonialism’ and ‘neo-patrimonialism’ have 
become linked to individual, personal rule and poor leadership, bad governance, and 
economic stagnation, but this is now being challenged. Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 
point out that when Weber first used the term, it ‘included notions of the reciprocity and 
voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled (Pitcher et al. 2009). Those 
reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of the rulers’. 
 
The Frelimo party has substantial power, which is built, in part, on patron-client 
relationships and a well organized structure closely integrated in the state apparatus. In 
this sense, Frelimo is similar to the political machines in cities in the United States in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which are sometimes described as 
patrimonial (Rudolph and Rudolph 1979). But there are two important and linked 
caveats. First, elections mean that citizens have a real check on Frelimo – in 1998 and 
1999 voting in large numbers against Frelimo and with the opposition winning control 
of five cities. Second, and linked to that, is that the party is more important than any 
individual.  
 
The replacement of Joaquim Chissano, after his poor showing in 1999, brings together 
all of these issues. First, the party responded to citizens and the strong statement by the 
voters. Second, although the president has substantial personal power, final authority 
rests with the party and not a person. Third, consideration of ‘corruption’ within the 
Frelimo elite is both nuanced and contested. The corruption associated with the 
Chissano post-war era was no longer seen as acceptable or productive. Armando 
Guebuza brings with him a new model, which is the subject of this paper. Finally, 
however, the circle is closed by the dominance, unity and resilience of the Frelimo party 
– Guebuza can marginalize and impose some checks on the more corrupt and predatory 
members of the elite, but Frelimo’s focus with unity meant that even the most grossly 
corrupt have to be kept within the party and there can be no investigations, even of the 
looting of the privatized banks. 
 
The question is whether the development of presidential companies should be more 
openly encouraged as a way of creating firms and groups which are dynamic and 
effective enough to be competitive and developmental. Can these presidential 
                                                 
24 Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2 May 2009. 
25 Savana 15 June 2007. 
 16
companies, through their privileged access to the state, potentially grow to a critical 
mass allowing them to become major players in the development of Mozambique and 
southern Africa, as happened in the past with privileged companies in the Asian Tigers, 
Latin America and South Africa? 
7 Path dependence and unsatisfied conditions 
This model of elite developmental capitalism is new and untested in Mozambique. We 
write of a picture that is only emerging and our description is contested. But we wish to 
conclude with two further observations. The first is the importance of history and path 
dependence. The second is that there are certain conditions for the creation of dynamic 
national companies which are not yet being satisfied. 
 
The early post-independence period of Mozambique was characterized by elite 
dominance of development and a foreign-dominated big-project model of rapid 
modernization. This has returned. There is still little state support for the creation and 
expansion of small and medium enterprises; although there is some improvement in the 
availability of money, there is still no sense of the need to think in terms of value 
chains, training, etc. In the late 1970s, the strategy was for the development of large, 
mechanized state farms, often with eastern European technology and technicians, and 
sometimes carrying out Portuguese colonial plans. Thirty years later, the same model – 
often with the same farms and same colonial plans – is back, but now with transnational 
companies investing in large plantations for sugar (for food and alcohol), jatropha (for 
biodiesel), rice, bananas and other crops. And as 30 years earlier, this is no support for 
small and medium Mozambican commercial farmers. So there is a real question as to 
whether Mozambican elite developmental capitalism can grow without the parallel 
development of a Mozambican small and medium sector. 
 
Having large groups with political and state connections seems to be a necessary 
condition for industrial development – but it is not sufficient. Research on successful 
developing countries suggests there are four other requirements: 
 
The first is conditions under which resources are given. In South Korea and other Asian 
Tigers, access to credit and state resources was highly conditional; companies had to 
meet rigid conditions for sales and exports to ensure that state resources were not 
wasted. So far, access to state rents in Mozambique is unconditional. Mexico provides a 
worrying example, where family and party links allowed high levels of unproductive 
rent-seeking. 
 
The second is the need for competition. Unquestionably, national companies need 
protection and support in the initial phase, but to be useful they must eventually be at 
least regionally competitive. Thus there needs to be a system which ensures that firms 
are steadily opened to competition. Writing on the BeST Consensus, Lee, Mathews and 
Wade say there must be ‘enough openness to ensure that most domestic firms are 
subject to close to world market prices (adjusted for transport costs) in most of their 
operations. Externally set prices put pressure on firms and the political leadership to be 
economically efficient’. This is a real problem in Mozambique, where, for example, 
protection of local construction companies has led to low quality and high cost. But 
Insitec is explicitly moving to be regionally competitive. 
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The third is that building national capacity requires collaboration, even between 
competing companies, in marketing, research and development, and other areas. For 
example, a group of privately owned cashew factories now export jointly under a single 
name, Zambique. In Brazil, the state development bank has a programme to bring 
together entrepreneurs in the same sector to foster collaboration and exchange of 
information and experience. Such collaborative groups are also better able to push the 
state for support, and such structured collaboration is needed in Mozambique. A 
concern for Mozambique is the importance of personal links with President Guebuza, 
and good people have been politically and economically marginalized because they fell 
out with him. The intense competition between Guebuza and Chissano is personal, 
political and economic, and a number of Chissano allies have been marginalized.26 
Also, in order to give the bank BCI to Celso Correia, Guebuza had to push former 
finance minister Magid Osman and his Mozambican company SCI out of the bank; 
Osman resisted and the chance to build collaborative links was lost. Interestingly, 
however, the marginalized people do not leave Frelimo (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 176). 
 
The fourth is that national companies can only be regionally and internationally 
competitive if they develop the ability to innovate, creating new products and improved 
production techniques. This requires collaboration and state support. Lee, Mathews and 
Wade note that ‘in tackling the task of building the capacities of firms, public agencies 
can help compensate for deficiencies in the existing structure of markets – agencies 
such as export-import banks, export processing zone administrations, development 
banks, technology institutes, and high-level state coordinating agencies (such as MITI 
and Ministry of Finance in Japan, the Industrial Development Bureau and the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute in Taiwan, and the National Development Reform 
Commission and the Export-Import Bank in China). 
 
Staffing such agencies with technically competent people is a high priority in countries 
following the BeST Consensus’. This has been difficult in Mozambique, because donors 
have been strongly and publicly opposed to a development bank and other support 
agencies, so government support has been given with little publicity and even 
clandestinely, as has been the case with cashew. It is easiest to start innovating around 
local problems and this is already taking place in the cashew sector; the Guebuza 
companies are heavily involved in developing uses of natural gas. Guebuza created a 
new Ministry of Science and Technology with a young, dynamic minister, but it so far 
is not providing R&D or other support for local companies. John Mathews (Mathews 
2007a, b) argues that biofuels ‘represent an exceedingly attractive option for developing 
countries’, in part because the crop mix and growing conditions are different in each 
country, and thus fuel extraction requires technological modifications which are ideal 
for local technicians to gain their initial skills. Mozambique is putting great emphasis on 
                                                 
26 There has also been a clear crackdown on the people publicly identified as most corrupt from the 
Chissano era, which can be seen both as a clean-up and as an attack on Chissano. Former Transport 
Minister Antonio Munguambe was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for corruption. Others arrested 
include former Interior Minister Almerino Manhenje and Orlando Come, the head of computing for 
elections. Come is an interesting example, because under his leadership the elections computing 
repeatedly failed, but in 1999 the much criticized lack of security in the computer systems allowed 
extra votes to be added for Chissano, which may have made the difference in a close election. (Hanlon 
1991; Hanlon 1996; Hanlon and Smart 2008; and Mozambique 129, 6 June 2008 <e-mail newsletter 
edited by Joseph Hanlon and posted on www.tinyurl.com/mozamb> and Mozambique Political 
Process Bulletin 31, 29 December 2004.) The allegation is that the new Guebuza broom is sweeping 
out the corrupt and incompetent linked to Chissano, but not those close to the Guebuza family. 
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biofuels, yet it is totally dependent on foreign companies for the technology, which 
means an opportunity to learn innovation skills is being lost. 
We argue here that such support is an essential part of any latecomer development 
strategy, and that presidential companies represent an important and necessary first step. 
But the road is still long, and discipline will be required. Can the Mozambican elite 
develop the culture of hard work, saving, and delayed consumption that was central to 
the economic development of the Asian tigers? 
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